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Bangladesh was born out of two violent partitions, each caused by elites being unable 
to agree about the distribution of rents. It has subsequently struggled to achieve 
political stability based on different mechanisms of rent distribution within its elites. 
In the midst of quite significant instability its economic performance improved in the 
1980s. Its experience therefore provides interesting case study material to examine 
and elaborate the LAO framework. The geographical territory of Bangladesh, then 
called East Pakistan, was first carved out of the eastern agrarian hinterland of Bengal 
in 1947 when British colonial rule ended. Unlike West Bengal which remained in 
India and which was significantly industrialized at that time, East Bengal was almost 
entirely an agrarian economy growing rice and jute. In the 1960s after very limited 
industrialization had been achieved, another set of violent confrontations between 
incumbent and emergent elites in Pakistan culminated in 1971 in the independence of 
East Pakistan as Bangladesh. In more recent years it has emerged as a relatively high-
growth developing country with a significant base in manufacturing based on the 
garments and textile industries. But it has an apparently dysfunctional governance 
structure and political system with frequent political standoffs between the major 
political parties. We will examine the evolution of the LAO in Bangladesh as a 
transition between three variants of a basic LAO to a fourth and final version which 
has elements of maturity but which is vulnerable and faces problems in enabling and 
sustaining sophisticated productive organizations. Indeed we will argue that there 
appears to be a tension between the capacity of LAOs in very poor countries to 
achieve sustainable political stability based on the accommodation of political 
organizations and its ability to assist the development of productive organizations.  
 
This analysis confronts the good governance reform agenda which has informed much 
of the reform efforts in the country but with very limited results in terms of achieving 
better scores on ‘good governance’. The paradox of poor scores on the good 
governance criteria and sustained growth over two decades has generated two types of 
responses. The dominant response has been to argue that growth in Bangladesh 
cannot be sustained unless progress on good governance is achieved rapidly. On the 
other hand, the inaction and lack of commitment of the ruling elites to implement any 
of these reforms suggests that their private assessment is quite different. Their actions 
suggest that the good governance agenda does not address their day-to-day problems 
of accumulation and political management.  
 
Both these responses are partially correct but also wrong in important respects. 
Improving governance is clearly necessary for sustaining growth given the 
vulnerability of growth in countries like Bangladesh. But the governance priorities 
may not be the ones that the good governance agenda identifies. Equally, the good 
governance agenda clearly does not give elites a workable reform agenda because it 
ignores the problem of how to maintain political stability in developing countries. But 
business as usual is just as dangerous for elites because the social order that has 
emerged is vulnerable and critical weaknesses need to be identified and addressed. 
The LAO framework focuses on how rents are allocated to achieve a cessation of 
violence. Some of these ways of achieving political stability may be more successful 
than others in the context of particular countries, and some may offer more growth 
opportunities than others. These differences need to be explored from a policy 
perspective to develop policy priorities that simultaneously address the political 
requirements of controlling violence and the economic requirements of sustaining 
growth.  
 
The difficulty of achieving improvements in terms of good governance has a lot to do 
with the fact that rent creation is necessary to satisfy powerful elites. While the 
allocation of rents to achieve political stability is clearly vital, some methods of rent 
allocation have failed to achieve peace and stability, and some types of rents have 
been very damaging for the economy. Other methods of rent allocation have achieved 
some measure of stability, and some types of rents have either been growth-enhancing 
or have at least been consistent with the continuation of growth. By examining some 
of these differences in the political and economic effects of different patterns of rent 
allocation we can improve our understanding of how the LAO in Bangladesh has 
performed and evolved in response to this performance. Reform strategies are likely 
to have a better chance of implementation if they are based on a proper understanding 
of the challenges facing the operation of an LAO in a specific country. The challenge 
is to design incremental institutional and organizational changes that improve the 
ability of competing elites to develop ‘live and let live’ strategies that also allow 
growth to be sustained if not accelerated.  
 
The evolution of the LAO in Bangladesh has gone through four major phases in 
response to successive economic and political problems. This evolution reveals 
underlying features of the economy and society which the evolving LAO has had to 
address. Independence from British rule in 1947 was followed by a period of 
instability and eventually military governance from 1958. Much of the Pakistan 
period was characterized by this military rule. We characterize the first phase of 
military rule from 1958 to 1971 as a ‘praetorian’ basic LAO. Here the dominant 
coalition was tightly defined by a military-bureaucratic coalition and their close 
business clients and allies. The most important rents were access to critical subsidies 
to enter productive activities and these were limited to a small number of business 
houses. Political rents were distributed to a broad-based group of rural 
representatives, by-passing traditional political organizers. The opposition of the latter 
was countered with the threat of force. This period achieved a significant 
improvement in the organizational sophistication in a small number of emerging 
capitalist sectors in the previously rather primitive economy. Many learning rents 
were created and early industrialization was rapid. However, the management of these 
rents was not very effective because political organizers were becoming increasingly 
powerful and could protect inefficient industrialists even in the context of the 
praetorian LAO. But the real failure of the praetorian LAO was that by excessively 
limiting access to rents it failed to maintain long-term political stability and Pakistan 
collapsed into catastrophic violence out of which the new country of Bangladesh was 
born in 1971.  
 
The second phase from 1971 to 1975 was a period of intensely unproductive 
‘primitive accumulation’ and a failed attempt to create a one-party populist 
authoritarianism. As a large number of previously excluded political organizers 
entered the rent capture game during this period, rent capture was extensive and 
damaging as asset stripping, over-employment and other types of damaging rent 
creation accelerated. Neither economic nor political viability was achieved as the 
central leadership lost control over all rents. The belated response of the nationalist 
leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was to attempt to control rent capture by constructing 
a more inclusive but still centrally controlled LAO in the form of a one-party 
‘socialist’ state. This too catastrophically failed as violence escalated and Mujibur 
Rahman and most of his family were assassinated. The support for and opposition to 
Mujib’s one-party plan was couched in terms of a debate about planning and 
socialism, but there were more mundane issues of rent allocation underpinning these 
debates. While a broad swathe of political organizers were to be included in the state-
party under this plan, it was clear that there were not enough rents to satisfy everyone. 
Most organizers, particularly those from other parties who were asked to join the new 
single party feared they would remain permanently minor players. There was serious 
opposition to the plan not only from outside but also within the ruling Awami League.  
 
The third phase from 1975 to 1990 we characterize as ‘clientelistic’ military 
governance where military leaders formed parties and ruled through extensive rent 
distribution in the context of occasional elections. The broad principles on which the 
competition for rents is organized in contemporary Bangladeshi politics began to 
emerge during this period. Ziaur Rahman who was president from 1977 till his 
assassination in 1981 was a popular freedom fighter and his presidency was quite 
different from that of his successor Ershad who ruled from 1982 till his overthrow 
following a mass uprising in 1990. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the character 
of the LAO there are some common features of the period as a whole. These were 
basic LAOs, but the new military rulers realized that the earlier praetorian approach of 
defining and protecting a narrow dominant coalition by force would not work. The 
new clientelistic logic was to selectively include enough political organizers in the 
dominant coalition to minimize the required threat of force to an acceptable level. 
And by not attempting to entirely rule out the organizational rights of outside political 
organizers, they also avoided the mistake of inclusive authoritarianism. At the same 
time, earlier ‘praetorian’ strategies of going over the heads of established political 
organizers to try and empower new layers below them through strategies of 
‘decentralization’ continued to be attempted.  
 
The combination of these strategies ensured considerably greater access for political 
organizers than in the praetorian phase. Zia reintroduced multi-party elections in 
1979, which his Bangladesh Nationalist Party won. However, given presidential 
control over the army and the administration, politics in this phase was essentially 
about negotiating inclusion into the dominant coalition led by the ex-military leader. 
This model proved to be unviable under Ershad who did not enjoy anything like Zia’s 
popularity or legitimacy. The military clientelistic period came to an end in 1990 with 
the overthrow of Ershad after months of violence. This marked the transition to a 
version of multi-party ‘democracy’ where the opposition has a non-trivial chance of 
winning and establishing a new dominant coalition consisting of a different set of 
individuals and coalitions having privileged access to the most significant rents. 
 
Another important characteristic of the 1980s was that a gradual economic turnaround 
began after the devastation of the war and the damage caused by destructive rent 
extraction from productive enterprises. Zia and Ershad began the process of 
privatization that slowly began to reduce asset stripping from productive enterprises. 
But given the weakness of regulatory agencies and property rights, even the privatized 
enterprises were only marginally better in terms of economic performance. 
Nevertheless, the separation of economic from political rents reduced the most 
damaging types of predatory rents in the economy. It also allowed the emergence of 
the garment industry, which President Zia was directly involved in establishing. 
Fortunately for Bangladesh, the garment industry was a beneficiary of accidentally 
created rents that were brought about by the quotas under the MFA. These rents 
created the incentives and the opportunities for the transfer of critical technological 
capabilities in this sector to Bangladesh. The experience of the garment industry 
suggests that even low technology sectors face market failures that constrain the 
transfer of technology. Value-enhancing rents and rent-management capabilities are 
likely to be required for creating productive organizations in new sectors. However, 
the use of rents to accelerate the emergence of viable productive organizations was no 
longer a focus of the dominant coalition which became increasingly focused on 
political stabilization, in stark contrast to the praetorian LAO.   
 
The fourth (and current) phase from 1990 onwards can be described as ‘competitive 
clientelism’ which sustains a vulnerable semi-mature LAO with characteristics of 
maturity as political organizations can be set up and operated to challenge the ruling 
coalition, and the support of the dominant coalition is not a precondition for setting 
up many types of economic organizations. In theory and to a large extent in practice 
the dominant coalition does not control the establishment of new organizations, 
including political organizations. Nevertheless, given the absence of a Weberian state 
enforcing a rule of law, the operation of organizations still requires assistance from 
political and state actors that has to be ‘purchased’ on a personalized basis. Moreover, 
the elements of maturity may be limited for important rents if we take a short time 
horizon because important rents (like the rents involved in major construction or 
power sector projects) are jealously controlled by the current dominant coalition. 
Similarly, the dominant coalition will try to keep tabs on and take steps against 
organizations that can threaten them (like television channels or some political 
organizations that engage in violence). Nevertheless, for a broad range of 
organizations, there is a great deal of ‘openness’ about who can set up these 
organizations, even though the support or non-intervention of the dominant 
coalition/state has to be purchased where required. Moreover, the current dominant 
coalition can in principle and also in practice be replaced by a new coalition if the 
opposition can organize a collective coalition that can challenge the organizational 
power of the ruling coalition.  
 
The contemporary LAO has a number of characteristics that create challenges in both 
the political and economic spheres. In the political sphere, party competition remains 
very vulnerable because ‘a rule of law for elites’ has not emerged and parties 
periodically get locked in violent confrontations about how to conduct elections. In 
the economic sphere, greater openness has had some paradoxical effects. Since the 
dominant coalition can change, this can occasionally have negative results for 
investment. Where large and long-term investments are required, as in the power 
sector, investors are wary of the possibility that a new coalition may overturn previous 
contracts. On the other hand, there are sectors like garments, pharmaceuticals and 
textiles where entrepreneurs and workers have the technological capabilities to be 
globally competitive. Organizations in these sectors are also unlikely to threaten the 
rent extraction strategies of the dominant coalition. Setting up productive 
organizations in these sectors has elements of maturity. Support from the dominant 
coalition is no longer a precondition for setting them up. Interestingly, these 
organizations are driving growth in contemporary Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the 
challenge is that acquiring technological capabilities in new sectors faces significant 
market failures. Without a strategy for addressing these market failures, the 
emergence of medium sized productive organizations is effectively constrained. Since 
responding to market failures typically involves the creation of policy-induced rents, 
the failure here is essentially a failure to create and manage productive rents.  
 
Phase One: The ‘Praetorian’ Basic LAO: 1958-1971 
Pakistan was created in 1947 out of some of the least developed agrarian parts of 
India. While both political stability and economic viability were of concern to the 
early leadership, for the military that took power in 1958, achieving economic 
viability was a priority. Political stability was to be achieved mainly through the 
suppression of organizational rights. As in the rest of South Asia, the fifties and 
sixties in Bangladesh were a period of catching up under ambitious industrial policies, 
but in this case under a tightly controlled dominant coalition. The ‘praetorian’ basic 
LAO that was in place from 1958 to 1971 kept in place a dominant coalition whose 
initial objective was to create more sophisticated productive organizations in modern 
industry. A secondary objective was to use rents to maintain political stability, but in 
a context where force was the primary mechanism for limiting access to rents to a 
narrow group.  
 
This strategy was misconceived because it did not adequately assess the strength of 
opposition that would be mounted by excluded rent-seeking groups. While there was 
a growing mobilization of excluded elites in both wings of Pakistan, the explosive 
nature of the mobilization in East Pakistan was that state policies during this period 
initially benefited non-Bengali entrepreneurs in what was then East Pakistan. 
Emerging Bengali elites largely excluded from the dominant coalition saw the state 
strategy as one of national suppression. Their distributive conflict against non-Bengali 
political, military and business elites eventually erupted in a massive breakdown of 
the social order, significant violence and the emergence of the independent nation of 
Bangladesh.  
 
An important feature of the basic LAOs that this experience reveals is that they are 
only stable if by accident or design enough of the potential organizers of violence are 
included within the ruling group. Pakistan’s military government in the 1960s was 
more concerned with accelerating development and less with stability, clearly because 
in its judgement potential violence by excluded elites could be contained by the state 
given its overwhelming asymmetry in the instruments of violence. This judgement 
could not have been more wrong. The result was instead a growing and increasingly 
violent mobilization in both wings of Pakistan that eventually brought down the 
military government in Pakistan as well as creating the new country of Bangladesh.  
 
The deep political and economic crisis in Pakistan at the end of British rule was not 
accidental. The economic underdevelopment of the region was bad enough but in 
addition trade links with industrial areas elsewhere in India were severed. The reasons 
behind the political crisis were even deeper. A constitutional crisis in the newly 
independent Pakistan was almost inevitable given the way in which the country was 
created. East Pakistan was poorer and less developed and had virtually no indigenous 
capitalists, and virtually no senior bureaucrats or army officers. West Pakistan too was 
underdeveloped compared to more advanced areas of India, but many of the 
immigrant Muslim businessmen and senior bureaucrats from other parts of India 
settled in West Pakistan as they were culturally closer to that region. The army too 
was largely drawn from the Punjab region of West Pakistan.  
 
The irony was that the indigenous elites in either wing of Pakistan had not been 
strongly behind the idea of Pakistan. The two most important Muslim-majority areas 
of India were Punjab (whose western part became the heart of West Pakistan) and 
Bengal (whose eastern part became East Pakistan). Neither had been strongly behind 
the idea of Pakistan before 1947. The demographic dominance of Muslims in these 
provinces meant that Muslims already enjoyed substantial power under the electoral 
system introduced by the British in 1936. The demand for Pakistan came from 
Muslim political elites in central and western India where Muslims were a minority. 
In particular, Jinnah used the demand for Pakistan as a bargaining tool to try and 
achieve a guarantee of federalism which he believed would ensure that Muslims all 
over India could exercise significant voice in an independent India (Jalal 1985: 258). 
When Nehru and the Congress Party failed to reach an agreement with Jinnah along 
these lines, and particularly after Nehru rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan proposal 
for a federal structure for India in 1946, Pakistan suddenly became inevitable.  
 
Jinnah’s Muslim League was not organizationally strong in either Bengal or Punjab 
and initially faced serious problems in trying to cobble together a Pakistani state. 
However, West Pakistan’s largely Punjabi elites soon discovered that they were the 
dominant group in the new state and this helped many of them to buy into the idea of 
Pakistan. In contrast, East Pakistan elites remained embroiled in conflicts with the 
central leadership. As a result of these tensions, the new state of Pakistan faced 
serious conflicts between elites from the outset and a decade of constitutional 
discussions failed to resolve the question of how rents should be distributed between 
these competing groups of elites.  
 
A central problem was that the relatively poorer and less developed East Pakistan had 
at that time a bigger population, making it difficult for the economically dominant 
West Pakistani elites to be assured that they would be able to ensure their political 
dominance through the electoral system. Even though East Pakistan was relatively 
underdeveloped compared to the West, political organizers were more organized in 
the East as it had a longer history of political mobilization against colonial rule. 
Moreover, rich peasants in East Bengal had been in power in the province since the 
1936 reforms which allowed rich peasant-led political parties like the secular Krishok 
Proja Party to win elections and form provincial governments in Bengal. East 
Bengal’s rich peasant political organizers could mobilize large numbers of people, 
possibly more than the political elites in West Pakistan could. These asymmetries in 
the economic, political and organizational capabilities of the elites of the two wings 
created insuperable difficulties in constructing a constitutional settlement between 
elites. The military coup of 1958 was the inevitable result. 
 
The coup led by Ayub Khan established a tightly controlled basic LAO. The 
imposition of martial law curtailed the organizational freedom to set up political 
organizations. The praetorian LAO controlled violence by limiting the access of 
aspiring political entrepreneurs to the rents now controlled by a dominant coalition 
consisting of the military-bureaucratic elite and their close business allies. For a 
while, the threat of force disrupted the ability of excluded organizers to pose a 
significant threat to the dominant coalition. At the same time control over access to 
foreign exchange, the exchange rate, interest rates and tariffs and quotas allowed the 
state to create rents for privileged business elites. The initial effect was not only 
greater political stability but also a sustained growth spurt that lasted through much of 
the 1960s. However, much of the rents that the state created and controlled were 
focused on establishing and promoting relatively sophisticated enterprises in new 
sectors. Controls over imports, an overvalued exchange rate that made machinery 
imports cheap and export subsidies that compensated for the overvalued currency 
created a structure of rents that created strong incentives for investment in import 
substituting industries and for learning the appropriate technologies. The early import 
substitution was primarily in textiles, generally of low capital intensity but was 
followed in other industries like chemicals, food industries and light manufacturing 
(Papanek 1967: 1-74). 
 
Though the state did not yet have the resources to provide rents in the form of 
subsidies to industrialists, the imposition of import controls and the rationing of 
scarce foreign exchange amounted to very significant hidden subsidies. Papanek 
reported that profits of fifty to a hundred percent a year were not uncommon in the 
early to mid-fifties (Papanek 1967: 33). Access to the foreign exchange licenses that 
were a critical part of realizing these rents required close relationships between the 
business, political and bureaucratic elites. The basic LAO developed the personal 
contacts that existed between the ruling Muslim League leadership and a small 
number of traders, dating back to the pre-partition days. 'Nation Building Companies' 
like the Mohammadi Steamship Company and Habib Bank Limited had been 
established by these traders in India in alliance with the Muslim League, and they 
provided obvious candidates when individuals or companies had to be offered 
industrial projects (J. Rashid and Gardezi 1983: 1-8). 
 
Economic growth was clearly an important strategic objective of the early leadership, 
even before the military takeover. The political elite realized that the survival of the 
country depended on achieving some economic growth. This required a close alliance 
with business and the direction of rents to some businesses to enable them to drive 
growth. A month after independence in 1947 from Britain, an industries conference 
was convened where various forms of assistance were offered to businessmen but the 
response was very poor. Partly as a result of this disappointment, in 1952 the Pakistan 
Industrial Development Corporation was set up, with the objective of setting up 
enterprises and then divesting them at attractive prices to risk-averse owners in the 
private sector. Four members on its board came from the leading business houses, and 
the first head of the Corporation, an enterprising public servant named Ghulam Faruq, 
went on to become one of the leading industrialists of the country. This arrangement 
allowed business to capture rents by getting the state to absorb all the risks of setting 
up a new plant, in particular absorbing the costs of learning the new skills. The 
relationship between business and government was therefore close to say the least, 
and the levels of accumulation and growth in the industrial sector were 
commensurate. 
 
Also established in the early years were the key financial institutions that would 
finance investments by new entrepreneurs in new industries that did not yet have a 
track record in the country. These were the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation (PICIC) and the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation (later Industrial 
Development Bank of Pakistan, IDBP) which were to assume great importance in 
later years (Alavi 1983: 46-50; Amjad 1983: 235-50). Once again, by providing low 
interest loans to entrepreneurs with inadequate collateral and experience, significant 
rents were allocated to business patronized by the dominant coalition.  
 
A small number of monopoly houses that happened to be controlled by non-Bengalis 
became the backbone of the investment boom of the sixties in both wings of Pakistan. 
From 1958 to 1970, PICIC allocated 44.7 per cent of its loans to thirteen monopoly 
houses, and even the IDBP, which focused on loans below 2.5 million rupees, 
allocated 31.9 per cent to thirty monopoly houses between 1961 and 1970 (Amjad 
1982: 51). Although these two institutions allocated about a fifth of total investible 
resources, leading businessmen from the monopoly houses were represented on the 
boards of all the state financial institutions and the Boards of Directors of other 
monopoly houses (Amjad 1982: 30-60, 1983: Table 9.7). By the late 1960s, the top 18 
business groups controlled 35% of industrial assets while the top 44 controlled around 
50% (Amjad 1982: 47). As a result of family cross-holdings, the figure for the 
percentage of assets controlled by the top families was even higher. In the popular 
press, the top twenty-two families became the butt of attacks as according to some 
calculations these families controlled a dominant share of the new productive assets in 
the country. Thus, by the late 1960s limited access in the economy had a figure: 
twenty-two families. 
 
Table 1 shows growth rates in different sectors between 1950 and 1980. The earlier 
growth rates proved to be unviable, largely because many of the higher technology 
firms that were being supported with (learning) rents never graduated to self-
sufficiency. Perhaps more of them may have if given more time, but political crises 
led to the abandonment of these strategies by the late 1970s.  
 
Table 1 Growth in East Pakistan / Bangladesh 1950-80 
 Manufacturing  Industry  Agriculture  
1950-55 9.5 11.5 2.4 
1955-60 8.5 8.6 0.3 
1960-65 10.6 17.4 3.2 
1965-70 5.3 7.7 2.8 
1970-75 -9.8 not available  not available  
1975-80 5.1 5.9 3.3 
Sources: Alamgir & Berlage (1974 Apdx C Table 4, Apdx 14-A), World Bank (1984; 
1986) 
 
The economic success of Pakistan in the 1960s led some observers, such as Gustav 
Papanek, a Harvard Advisory Group economist working on Pakistan, to publicize 
Pakistan as a new model of growth (Papanek 1967: 2). With the benefit of hindsight, 
the weakness of Papanek’s analysis was that this acceleration of growth depended on 
the state’s ability to direct vast quantities of resources into the hands of a tiny 
emerging capitalist class during the late fifties and early sixties. The early results of 
growth in Papanek’s statistics concealed the fact that these accumulation strategies 
were based on a very vulnerable basic LAO and the state had very limited capacities 
to govern these subsidies to ensure that productivity growth was rapid enough to 
make the investments viable. 
 
First, as in India, the state’s governance capabilities for limiting moral hazard 
problems were not sufficiently developed. The result was that even by the late sixties, 
new enterprises set up a decade ago had not graduated to the point where they could 
become globally competitive without the implicit rents continuing. The popular 
perception therefore was that this was a strategy for enriching privileged groups. The 
second weakness, closely connected to the last, was the failure to develop a broad-
based Bengali capitalist class (in East Pakistan/Bangladesh). The weakness of the 
Bengali bourgeoisie is reflected in Table 2 since much of the growth in industrial 
investments in East Pakistan initially took place through a growth in the public sector, 
peaking at 53 percent of total investments in 1968. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
praetorian LAO failed to allocate sufficient rents to potential organizers of violence 
and allocated too many rents to client capitalists, and even within there group of client 
capitalists, there were almost none from the eastern wing. An emerging alliance 
between excluded business interests and political interests in East Pakistan proved to 
be devastating for the stability of the regime.  
 
Table 2 Industrial Investment in West and East Pakistan 1961-71 
(Million Rupees in Constant 1960 Prices)
 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
West Pak 852.94 846.15 757.05 1062.50 1221.43 1087.96 987.16 1013.79 916.87 1061.36  
%Public    
Sector  
5.1 3.9 15.6 3.2 9.8 10.8 10.9 11.6 8.3  3.2 
East Pak 205.99 459.42 332.21 382.30 450.21 390.00 477.02 799.81 796.84 700.88  
%Public 
  Sector 
21.7  13.8 29.8 24.3 24.3 25.0 24.8 53.0 50.7 45.7 
 
All Pak 1058.9 1305.6 1089.3 1444.8 1671.6 1478.0 1464.2 1813.6 1713.7 1762.2 
 
Source: Amjad (1982: Table A.9). The Pakistan rupee was equal to USD 4.8 at that time. 
 
Nevertheless, there was some growth of a Bengali industrial capitalist class in this 
period concentrated in medium enterprises. At the time of independence in 1971, one 
study found sixteen ‘large’ Bengali business houses, each with assets of more than Rs. 
25 million, and with combined assets of nearly Rs. 700 million (S. Baranov, cited in 
Sobhan (1980: 15)). The Pakistani rupee was roughly equal to 4.8 US dollars at that 
time. The bulk of the nascent industrial bourgeoisie was, however, small to medium 
entrepreneurs. Excluding the large jute and textile industries, state financial 
institutions funding the establishment of enterprises had, by 1971, given over 3000 
loans to Bengalis, most below Rs. 400,000, helping to set up around 1300 units 
(Sobhan and Ahmad 1980: 64-5). However, a much bigger group of the Bengali lower 
middle classes felt totally excluded by these policies. These classes provided the 
political entrepreneurs and organizers who led an increasingly successful mobilization 
against the dominant coalition.  
 
Even the praetorian order could not do without any rent distribution for political 
stability. The key point is that these rent allocations were relatively minor compared 
to the major focus of the leadership at that time. The major institutional mechanism 
for purchasing stability was the so-called Basic Democracy system that Ayub 
innovated with the Basic Democracies Order of 1959, one of the first acts of his 
regime. This attempted to by-pass the established political elites and entrepreneurs 
based in the towns by creating a new constituency of rent recipients in the villages. A 
system of 80,000 ‘basic democrats’ were elected on a non-party basis and they were 
the electoral college for electing members of parliament. Authoritarian regimes have 
often used this tactic of going over the heads of their immediate opponents by 
appealing to the interests of those below them. The latter initially demand a lower 
price and the authoritarian leader often believes they will be easier to control. The 
Basic Democrats also directly elected the President. The provision of relatively 
limited rents to this large army of rural representatives through rural infrastructure 
construction programmes and Food for Work programmes was for a time sufficient to 
create a countervailing source of support for the regime that made it difficult to 
organize dissent (Sobhan 1968). 
 
In the end, the Basic Democracy plan was self-defeating. As the rural basic democrats 
became more confident and ambitious, they saw obvious opportunities in throwing 
their lot in with the growing dissent in the towns. When this began to happen in the 
late 1960s, not only did the ‘hot house’ development in this LAO come under threat, 
the social order was fundamentally challenged as there were no easy ways of 
incorporating enough excluded elites into the system quickly enough. Under pressure 
in both wings of Pakistan, the military government allowed elections in 1970 that 
gave the East Pakistan based Awami League an absolute majority in the all-Pakistan 
parliament as the East had a majority of seats in the central legislature. This led to an 
even more serious constitutional crisis for Pakistan as West Pakistan based elites were 
unwilling to let an East Pakistan party form the government. The last desperate act of 
the praetorian LAO was a bloody crackdown on political organizers and their 
intellectual supporters in East Pakistan in March 1971. As the conflict became 
increasingly bloody, the basic LAO rapidly collapsed into a fragile one. Ultimately, 
the social order could not be sustained and as the civil war intensified and transformed 
into a war for liberation and independence, Pakistan’s historic enemy India intervened 
to assist the Bengali struggle for independence and the independent country of 
Bangladesh was born in 1971. 
 
Phase Two: The Rise and Fall of a One-Party ‘Populist Authoritarian’ LAO 1972-5 
The political break of 1971 allowed the emergence of a direct relationship between 
upwardly mobile Bengali elites and the state that had never before existed in East 
Bengal. However, the excluded Bengali political entrepreneurs had a limitless appetite 
for primitive accumulation and as yet no entrepreneurial capabilities to productively 
operate any of the assets and resources they were capturing. The result of the massive 
acceleration of primitive accumulation was initially catastrophic for economic 
rehabilitation after the war, which had been disruptive enough on its own. 
Nevertheless, it was through these processes that a new Bengali capitalist class was to 
emerge after a decade. The second phase from 1972 to 1975 was characterized by 
extensive and unproductive ‘primitive accumulation’ and a failed transition to a one-
party populist authoritarianism.  
 
The huge upsurge in the numbers of political entrepreneurs who now wanted a share 
of the rents that they believed were forthcoming given their claim to be part of the 
new dominant coalition made it difficult to construct a new social order. On top of the 
ravages caused by the conflict, the victory created a big gap between the aspirations 
of a multitude of organizers who had participated in or claimed to have participated in 
the freedom struggle and the rents available for them to capture. Rent capture took the 
form of very damaging types of ‘primitive accumulation’ as abandoned assets were 
grabbed and sometimes stripped, and nationalized mills and factories were used to 
create unsustainable rents in the form of unsustainable employment and pricing 
policies. The LAO had many aspects of fragility in the first three years after 
interdependence, with armed gangs grabbing resources openly.  
 
Violence kept erupting because the distribution of rents between the vastly increased 
numbers of claimants could not be settled by any other obvious means. Central 
control over the party and the growing number of organizers outside the party could 
not be easily established. Individuals and groups who received less than they expected 
threatened to leave the party and engage in opposition or violence from outside, 
unless they were accommodated on their terms. Unfortunately, accommodating all 
individuals and groups on their terms would add up to more redistribution than the 
economy could possibly sustain. The growing conflicts were expressed in a number of 
ideological debates: between those who had fought or claimed to have fought in the 
war of liberation and those who for various reasons had not or could not, and between 
slightly different versions of the now dominant ‘socialist’ ideological consensus. 
Behind these debates was of course also a concern about who would have the power 
to decide or limit the allocation of rents. 
 
This situation was clearly unsustainable and the ruling party, the Awami League, 
attempted to re-assert a basic LAO by attempting to create a one-party state. In 
January 1975 the fourth amendment to the constitution was pushed through despite 
misgivings amongst many party members only when Prime Minister Mujib, the leader 
of the liberation movement threatened to resign (Karim 2005: 348). The constitutional 
amendment changed Bangladesh to a presidential system, with power concentrated in 
the hands of Mujib who became the president. The amendment also provided for the 
creation of a ‘national party’ with the sole power to engage in political activity, and 
all members of parliament and the president had to belong to this party. In February 
all parties were suspended and the national party launched. This was the Bangladesh 
Krishok Sromik Awami League (Workers and Peasants Awami League) or BAKSAL 
(Mascarenhas 1986: 57). The plan had the strong support of the pro-Moscow faction 
of the Communists as it fitted in with the blueprint of similar one-party experiments in 
other parts of the developing world then supported by Moscow. Socialist ideology 
aside, this was clearly also an attempt to reassert central control over rent allocation 
within a defined dominant coalition, in other words, to re-create an authoritarian one-
party version of a basic LAO.  
 
However, ideologies do matter. There was genuine disquiet about the plan from those 
who believed it was the thin end of the wedge that would convert the country into a 
planned economy of the Stalinist type. No doubt, the pro-Moscow communist support 
for the plan was based on the same expectation. Nevertheless, the failure of this 
proposal to win the support of many of Mujib’s key lieutenants was significant. Many 
people inside and outside the party saw the move as a logical culmination of steps 
towards an authoritarian protection of the rents of the ruling coalition. The 1973 
elections, though it resulted in a huge victory for the Awami League had revealed the 
vulnerability of many of the top leaders of the party and their re-election was widely 
believed to have been achieved through interventions in the electoral process (Karim 
2005: 305-8). Many of Mujib’s henchmen and relatives were already deeply 
unpopular for their acts of appropriation and their blatant immunity from all legal 
restrictions.  
 
As the opposition National Awami Party put it: ‘Pakistan’s 22 families have become 
Bangladesh’s 2000’ (Karim 2005: 290). They could have added that the rents of the 
2000 were based entirely on expropriation and were not even remotely associated 
with learning or industrialization. The paramilitary Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (JRB) was 
increasingly used to protect Awami Leaguers from attack and also to intimidate voters 
during elections (Karim 2005: 273). It was in this context that the introduction of 
BAKSAL has to be assessed. While there was little public demonstration against the 
constitutional amendment, the climate of fear was not appropriate for the free 
expression of views. In secret, many different groups began to plot Mujib’s violent 
removal (Mascarenhas 1986: 64). Mujib himself was aware that the fourth 
amendment could not represent a permanent solution and was an emergency response 
to a situation going out of control: ‘This one-party arrangement is purely temporary. 
Once I have saved the country from counter-revolution I will restore multi-party 
democracy’ (quoted in Karim 2005: 258). Mujib’s enemies were not only based in 
other parties and in the army, but within his own party. Many ‘rightist’ members of 
his cabinet and indeed some foreign embassies were aware that a strike was being 
planned against him and his family (Lifschultz 1979; Mascarenhas 1986). And so it 
was that on the 15th of August 1975, less than four years after achieving 
independence, the founding father and president of the new country was assassinated.  
 
Independently of the secret betrayals and conspiracies, it is also clear that the plan to 
create a one-party state was deeply unpopular with many sections of the elites who it 
hoped to bring together into an inclusive basic LAO. Since the viability of an LAO is 
that significant organizers of violence should have an incentive to desist from 
violence, the BAKSAL experiment was demonstrably a failure. The interesting 
question is why the attempt to define the dominant coalition in this way did not find 
broad support amongst the very group that it was trying to incorporate. The likely 
answers to this question have important implications for understanding the nature of 
the LAO that subsequently emerged in Bangladesh.  
 
The essential problem with an attempt to impose order on rent allocation in poor 
countries using a one-party authoritarian structure is that there is no well-defined elite 
to begin with. Political accumulation in South Asia is a dynamic process where 
sequential layers of political entrepreneurs are continuously emerging at all levels. 
One way of imagining this is to think of a multitude of patron-client organizations 
with conveyor belts in each taking enterprising individuals higher up and with 
individuals at higher levels occasionally making a transition from purely political 
accumulation to various combinations of political and economic accumulation as they 
begin to invest in productive enterprises of different types. A single authoritarian 
populist party is simply a coalition of a large number of patron-client organizations 
which arrange brought together in a larger coalition. Attempting to define rent 
allocation in a coherent way in this context faces two sorts of problems.  
 
The first problem is to determine the distribution of rents between and within the 
different patron-client organizations which together constitute the bigger coalition. If 
each of these organizations was generating its own rents and the question was only 
about protecting the rents of each, the problem would be a lot simpler and the 
organizations could collectively provide third-party enforcement for other 
organizations. This may happen if all organizations were productive organizations or 
if the patrons of each organization were extracting rents solely from their own clients. 
But in fact, if a significant part of the rents of organizations were based on primitive 
accumulation, each coalition is targeting the same pool of social resources for capture. 
In this case, the distribution of rents between organizations cannot be guaranteed by 
the organizations themselves. Each organization can no longer provide third-party 
enforcement for the rents of other organizations because there is likely to be a conflict 
of interest. Only a very strong leader could do the arbitration of rent distribution 
between organizations and that too only if the leader had the support of most 
organizations most of the time.  
 
Prior to its authoritarian phase, the Awami League was facing a growing crisis in 
managing its intra-party distributive conflicts. Significant numbers of leaders within 
the party were disaffected and some were leaving. This was already happening as 
early as 1972. In particular, the departure of a significant section of the ‘left-wing’ of 
the Awami League to form the Jatiyo Shomajtantrik Dal, JSD, in 1972 was 
significant. If the distribution between coalitions depends on the decision of a 
supreme leader, all coalitions have to be confident of their access to that leader, and 
the leader has to have sufficient authority to impose decisions once taken. The 
transition to authoritarianism and the attempt to include all organizers within a one-
party structure has to be understood in this context. It is not clear that Mujib had the 
authority and physical concentration of force to ensure that all individual organizers 
would come into the single party structure and then accept the distribution of rents 
that the leader imposed. Historically, a sustainable one-party system requires a 
considerable concentration of the control over rents and of the instruments of force at 
the centre and this was not in evidence in Bangladesh in 1975. Since all coalitions 
cannot be sure that the leader will treat them fairly ex post, and since leaving a single 
party is neither credible nor legally possible, only coalitions already close to the 
leader would voluntarily agree to join up.  
 
The second problem is to define the limits of the dominant coalition. There are 
potentially an indefinite number of political organizers who believe they have enough 
capacity to challenge the dominant coalition to deserve inclusion and a share of rents. 
However, the more organizers who are included, the smaller the rents that existing 
organizers can capture. The problem for a formal and well-defined dominant coalition 
like a one-party state is that it defines insiders and outsiders clearly and creates strong 
incentives for outsiders to unite against insiders. In the praetorian order, the insiders 
were not formally defined, but it was clear that a very small group was privileged. 
The political rents were broadly distributed but to less powerful organizers and force 
could not prevent powerful organizers from opposing the system. The proposed one-
party state defined a broader group as potential insiders but it defined the borders very 
clearly. This created strong incentives for all those who felt they may be excluded or 
may get an insufficient payoff to oppose the arrangement. 
 
Apart from the difficulty of organizing primitive accumulation through a one-party 
state in the context of rapidly emerging elites, a further problem for the populist 
authoritarian model was that some of the primitive accumulation was already 
resulting in emergent capitalists who did not want the limitations of ‘socialism’. By 
1974, some of the appropriation had created a potential ‘capitalist’ class who wanted 
opportunities to convert some of their acquisition into productive enterprises. The 
required policy changes would be the legalization of property rights over their 
potential investments. These policies promised to give them a new set of rents but 
these were more likely to be productive rents in the context of dissipation that 
characterized Bangladesh at that time. Pressure from this group had already resulted 
in a revision of the government’s ‘socialist’ industrial policy. In 1974 the ceiling on 
private investment was increased from two and a half million to thirty million takas. 
Partnerships with foreign private investors were allowed, and the moratorium on 
nationalization was increased from ten to fifteen years. The emerging capitalists were 
obviously not too excited by the prospect of a one-party state where these changes 
may have been reversed. Some of the most successful accumulators under the Awami 
League thus became alienated from the party they had benefited from and constituted 
an internal ‘rightist’ source of opposition to the proposed LAO.  
 
It appears that viable well-defined dominant coalitions like one-party states require 
either the military dominance of a leadership based on its control over a significant 
immediate flow of rents coming for instance from natural resource rents or it requires 
strong broadly-based party organizations that offer credible ‘career paths’ for 
organizers at all levels to rise up the chain in the future in a growing economy. Where 
the leadership already controls a significant flow of rents from say extractive 
resources, this can provide them with the military ability to deal with outsiders and 
offer enough to insiders to achieve enough support. Some oil rich one-party states 
provide examples of this variant. Still, the calibration of the frontiers of the party is 
critical to ensure that the available force was sufficient to deal with potential dissent. 
Of course, the degree of concentration of force and rents that is required to make a 
one-party system of this type viable is not defined in absolute terms, but rather in 
relation to the organizational strength of potential organizations who are demanding 
rents by threatening violence.  
 
Another variant that appears to work is the single party that is very broadly based and 
therefore not immediately offering significant rents to individuals lower down the 
organizational chain, but with stable and credible career paths for aspiring organizers 
to move up the pyramid. The credibility of a party to offer a future of increasing rents 
over time implies that the party has access to productive rents. This kind of strategy 
may therefore work if a well-organized party is operating a version of a 
developmental state, as in contemporary China. Mujib’s BAKSAL had neither 
feature. It did not control enough resources immediately to create a cohesive coalition 
based on the control of rents and of force at the centre. Indeed, the party did not even 
control the army as Mujib’s assassins came from that critical organization. Nor did the 
party have a credible development strategy and a strong internal organization that 
could allow it to incorporate a broad range of organizers who were assured of a fair 
share of future rents.   
 
The rents that competing coalitions in Bangladesh were chasing during this period are 
therefore also relevant. The fragility of the LAO was both a cause and a consequence 
of the fact that political appropriation at this time was largely unproductive. It was 
based on grabbing abandoned assets, appropriating public resources through the 
creation of excess employment, construction contracts, import contracts, and so on. 
These types of primitive accumulation create zero-sum rents that at best have no 
positive effect on production, and in many cases can have a significant negative 
effect. A major target of the appropriation was the assets abandoned by departing 
Pakistanis. But in the chaos, the assets of many Bangladeshis were also targeted, 
including assets of any group who could be associated with the Pakistanis, such as the 
Bihari (non-Bengali) population. Not only that, the assets of many Hindus (who had 
never been supporters of Pakistan) were also grabbed (Karim 2005: 283-90).  
 
The significant productive assets of West Pakistani capitalists like major factories 
could not be immediately privately appropriated but were nationalized by the state 
resulting in an increase in the state’s share in modern industry from 34 per cent to 81 
per cent. But even this was not enough for the new political order. The Presidential 
Order of March 1972 brought in addition, previously Bengali-owned factories in the 
jute, cotton and sugar sectors into public ownership. This raised the public sector’s 
share to no less than 92 per cent of the assets of modern industry with a corresponding 
increase in the economic resources and jobs the state could allocate to its core 
supporters (Sobhan and Ahmad 1980: Table 10.1; Murshid and Sobhan 1987: 3-4). 
 
Employment in the public services witnessed a dramatic expansion. At the time of 
liberation in 1971, there were 450,000 employees of all grades in the public services, 
of which only 320 were officers at the level of Joint Secretary or above. By 1973 total 
employment in the public services had increased to over 650,000, with officers in the 
higher grades increasing to 660 (World Bank 1984: 109). Some of this growth was 
due to the change in coverage from the inclusion of new industrial units within the 
public sector which brought their administrative staff within the ambit of the public 
services. But the number of white collar staff in Bangladesh’s small industrial sector 
would only account for a fraction of the increase. 
 
The coalitions within the ruling party now used their political power to enrich 
themselves (Umar 1980; E. Ahmed 1986: 27). Nurul Islam, an economist in the 
Planning Commission at that time describes some of the processes which lay behind 
this change: “By 1974 there were a number of factors which had contributed to an 
accumulation of surplus funds in private hands. For one thing, high profits were 
earned in domestic and import trading activities, including illegal trade such as trade 
in contraband goods and in smuggling jute and other exportables across the border. 
Since these transactions were illegal, the risk premium was high and hence profits, 
once realised, were high. In addition, many residential buildings and trading or 
commercial enterprises, abandoned by Pakistanis, were illegally occupied by private 
persons. The ‘caretakers’ of such commercial enterprises, hastily appointed by the 
government in 1972 immediately after independence, made large fortunes through the 
undeclared sale of assets. Moreover, there were gains to be obtained from rental or 
sales proceeds of the abandoned houses which were illegally occupied by private 
persons. Those who had accumulated financial resources were pressing the 
government to commit itself to a more substantial and permanent role for private 
enterprise in the economy of Bangladesh” (Islam 1979: 225-6). 
 
This accelerated primitive accumulation had the expected negative effects on 
economic performance. An assessment of 1970-1975 is difficult because of the very 
real disruptions caused by the war, and the short life of the regime. Productivity in 
manufacturing was on average less than 50% of the level reached in 1970 and real 
wages in manufacturing, around 60% of their 1969/70 level (World Bank 1978: Vol. 
II Annex I.6 p. 173, 1984: Vol. II Table 9.12 p. 118). In addition, in 1974 Bangladesh 
suffered from a serious famine that took place without any significant decline in 
aggregate food availability (Sen 1983). The causes were largely state failure in 
managing distribution and ensuring purchasing power in a context of hoarding and 
smuggling. More than a million people died in the famine, probably more than in the 
war of liberation (Sen 1983: 134-41; Karim 2005: 335-40). The state could not of 
course remain insulated from the political consequences of the collapsing economy. 
The impetus for the ‘Second Revolution’ and the creation of a one-party state also 
came from the economic crisis and the need to control the expropriation, speculation 
and smuggling that was destroying the economy.  
 
Phase Three: Clientelistic Military Governance 1975-90 
The problems of the first two phases help to explain many features of the transition 
that happened subsequently. Mujib’s assassination brought the military to power 
through a series of bloody coups and counter-coups. But the military leadership knew 
by now that neither the Pakistani praetorian model nor the authoritarian one-party 
model would work in Bangladesh. General Zia, who formally became president in 
1977 was a decorated freedom fighter and widely popular. Nevertheless, he took care 
to construct a strong constituency of supporters for his rule. He did this by 
constructing a political party that eventually became the Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP) which remains one of the two dominant parties in contemporary Bangladesh. 
The third phase from 1975 to 1990 was one of ‘clientelistic’ military rule where 
military leaders took power to form their own parties and ruled through extensive 
rent distribution and the reintroduction of multi-party democracy. The strategy for 
constructing the dominant coalition had a number of important features distinct from 
the earlier phases.  
 
First, the terms on which individual coalition leaders joined the dominant coalition 
were individually bargained. Individual organizers could join or depart from the 
dominant coalition depending on calculations of net benefits by the party leader and 
individual coalition leaders bargaining for entry. The terms of the bargaining were 
simple: the national leader wanted to incorporate the largest number of the most 
important organizers into the party at the lowest price in terms of the rents that they 
demanded. A broad ideology of development and nationalism defining the new party 
allowed individual organizers from the far left and right of the spectrum and everyone 
in between to seek terms for entry into the new dominant coalition. The price that 
individual leaders could extract depended on their proven organizational capabilities 
in the past and the significance of their departure for undermining their erstwhile 
parties. As other parties were no longer banned, organizers had the chance of proving 
their organizational abilities outside the BNP before seeking terms for incorporation. 
Opposition parties were allowed to set up, operate and contest elections. The only 
limitation was that it was implicitly clear that the top job was not up for grabs because 
the dominant party was unlikely to be defeated at an election given its control over the 
administration. 
 
Secondly, no attempt was made to define ex ante the boundaries of the dominant 
coalition. The regime maintained the right to calibrate the size of the dominant 
coalition, again through a competitive process of assessment and negotiation. This too 
ensured that excluded elites had an expectation that they may be included on 
appropriate terms in the future if they played according to the rules of the game. The 
combination of these two characteristics ensured that the minimum required rents 
were competitively allocated to the most important political organizers and political 
stability was as a consequence achieved.  
 
Finally, both Zia and Ershad attempted to check the power of established political 
organizers by creating new rural voices through processes of decentralization. These 
strategies were quite similar to the Basic Democracy strategy of the praetorian period, 
but now they were a complementary part of a broader strategy and not the exclusive 
source of redistributive rents for achieving political stability. Even so, these strategies, 
particularly Ershad’s attempt to create political legitimacy for a new class of political 
representatives in the newly created ‘upazillas’ (a tier of government constituting a 
small number of villages), was strongly opposed by urban political organizers. These 
strategies therefore had a limited effect in enhancing overall political stability during 
this period, and the attempt to force them through possibly had a negative effect.  
 
This period remained on the whole a period of considerable instability. Violence 
continued for a while, particularly within the army, where coups were frequently 
attempted. Nevertheless, some signs of a viable LAO began to emerge which were 
later built upon in the fourth phase. Firstly, the strategy of ensuring entry to political 
organizers through individual negotiations to determine the ‘price’ that was being 
demanded in terms of access to rents proved to be a viable strategy for constructing 
coalitions. It remains the strategy through which competing political parties in the 
fourth ‘democratic’ phase construct the coalitions that sustain their power in and out 
of office. By its nature, it means that the ruling coalition is turbulent with constant 
negotiations, infighting and sometimes violence, both within the coalition and with 
coalitions currently out of power. But in the absence of any better method of 
determining the distribution of rents within the ruling coalition, this has emerged as 
the operative default mode. After a fashion, it works.  
 
Secondly, the openness in terms of defining the boundaries of the dominant coalition 
has proved to be extremely useful in managing the perpetual entry of new aspirants 
into the ruling coalition. The clientelistic military period allowed new entry but not to 
the heights of the political pyramid which were reserved for the current military 
leadership. This proved to be unsustainable. On the one hand it created strong 
incentives for ambitious officers within the army to try and replace the supreme 
leader. There were very frequent coup attempts under Zia in particular, as the 
traditions of violent seizures of power were still very fresh. In fact, Zia was finally 
killed in a coup by army officers in 1981. On the other hand, the apparent reservation 
of the top job for a single individual also resulted in strong opposition to the system as 
a whole led by ambitious civilian political organizers who led other parties. The 
futility of elections to place the top leader (as opposed to revealing organizational 
prowess that could be used to bargain for inclusion into the dominant coalition) 
became apparent under Ershad and resulted in a growing mobilization against him. As 
the BNP (the mass party set up by Zia) was now in opposition, this mobilization 
brought together the BNP with the Awami League, the party that had tried to set up 
BKSAL under Mujib. Under a combined and increasingly intense and violent 
mobilization, Ershad was deposed in 1990, marking the end of clientelistic military 
rule. 
 
During the clientelistic military period, economic and political organizations could be 
set up relatively freely, without the prior clearance and approval of the dominant 
coalition for most categories of organizations. However, since the most important 
organization was the ruling party and the coalition it constructed, and entry into this 
was foreclosed without the approval of the dominant coalition, the system at the 
highest level had all the characteristics of a basic LAO. There were also important 
changes happening in the types of rents that organizations were seeking and capturing 
at this stage. The most rampant types of primitive accumulation began to die down as 
most abandoned assets had been appropriated. However, economically damaging 
politically-created rents continued to be created explicitly as part of political 
stabilization strategies. These included, for instance, rents distributed to supporters of 
the ruling coalition in government construction contracts, or in import contracts for 
scarce commodities like sugar and cement.  
 
An important change that took place around this time compared to the praetorian 
phase was that the dominant coalition no longer saw rents as having any potentially 
productive purpose, and stopped trying to create or allocate rents as part of an explicit 
industrial policy. Subsidies, for instance to agriculture or on fuel prices were justified 
on welfare grounds but the earlier market failure justification for infant industry 
protection or technology acquisition began to die down. This was partly because of 
the memory of the political fight against the twenty-two families of Pakistan and the 
sham socialism of the Awami League, and partly because the international climate of 
economic opinion that informed the advice coming to Bangladesh had changed 
radically in the 1980s. Zia was an advocate of privatization for all these reasons. The 
rents that public sector industries and the newly privatized industries continued to 
receive was because the state was too weak to remove these rents as powerful clients 
were benefiting, not because the ruling coalition believed that this would accelerate 
the modernization of the economy. Indeed, given the capacities of the state to manage 
these rents, there was little chance that rents could play a productive role unless new 
capabilities and political arrangements were developed. But this was not part of the 
agenda. Nevertheless, we shall see that an accidental set of rents and Zia’s 
interventions did result in the introduction of the garment industry into Bangladesh 
that was to change the economic structure of the country. 
 
Between 1976 and 1983, a total of 217 public sector enterprises were wholly or 
partially sold to the private sector or returned to their former Bengali owners from 
whom they had been nationalized without compensation in the aftermath of liberation. 
However, significant denationalizations only began under the regime of General 
Ershad. Under the New Industrial Policy adopted in 1982, denationalizations of large-
scale public enterprises were given priority. Privatization faced substantial and 
growing political opposition, particularly from the trade unions of white collar 
workers where the over-employment was most significant (Bhaskar and Khan 1995). 
Nevertheless, the government divested 110 large units in little more than a year, 
including jute mills that had previously been owned by Bengalis, after which the 
programme continued at a slower pace (World Bank 1984: 149). The privatizations 
were supported by international agencies, but in effect they had a very limited impact 
on the economy. The large-scale enterprises that had been created under the Pakistani 
industrial policy of the sixties had never achieved full global competitiveness. When 
they were nationalized in the seventies they built up additional and vast liabilities on 
their books because of over-employment, looting and mismanagement. This did 
nothing to help their future viability when they were gradually privatized in the 
eighties. The new owners took over the liabilities as well, wrongly believing that 
political arrangements could be worked out to sustain subsidies into the future. Some 
of the privatized firms limped on and were lucky to become moderately profitable. 
Many eventually closed down, particularly in the jute and cotton textile sectors.  
 
The net effect of the Pakistani industrial policy as well as the accelerated primitive 
accumulation that happened in the immediate aftermath of independence did not take 
the country to a significantly higher technological level. Rather, the main effect was 
to achieve the creation of a new moneyed class through a process of primitive 
accumulation that began in the fifties. By the mid-1980s, Bangladesh had a potential 
small to medium capitalist class who had accumulated relatively significant blocks of 
capital. There were by now at least hundreds of individuals who could if called upon 
raise $100,000 or more of capital in the form of land, liquid capital or collateralized 
bank loans for investment. These individuals began to look around for simple 
technologies to invest in, now as economic entrepreneurs. It was at this stage that a 
lucky accident involving internationally created rents had a significant impact on 
Bangladesh’s prospects. 
 
The MFA and the acquisition of garments technologies 
The growth of the ready-made garments industry in Bangladesh has often been 
presented as a vindication of the success of free market policies combined with the 
virtual absence of labour market protections in Bangladesh. But in fact investment 
even in the simplest of technologies involves significant risks for domestic investors 
when these technologies are new to the economy. The time it will take to become 
globally competitive is not known and entrepreneurs have no idea of what production 
in very specialized globalized production networks entails. Nor is it viable for foreign 
firms to invest in upskilling labour in a poor economy in low-margin, low technology 
industries unless there is some cost-sharing and risk-sharing for the foreign firm. This 
is of course why all global production does not rapidly shift to the poorest countries. 
A combination of factors made this transfer of technology feasible for Bangladesh in 
the early 1980s.  
 
An important component was the emergence of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) 
in 1973. This was an arrangement administered by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). MFA set bilaterally negotiated quotas on developing countries for 
textile and clothing exports primarily to satisfy US objections to free trade with 
garment producing countries which threatened its domestic garment and textile 
industry. As a concession to global opinion, the MFA did not put quotas on a number 
of least developed countries like Bangladesh which did not have any garment industry 
at the time and were therefore no threat to the US (Goto 1989). For Bangladesh, it was 
fortuitous that just at that time a potential investor class was emerging through the 
industrialization efforts and primitive accumulation that we have described. The MFA 
created ‘quota rents’ for Bangladesh that implicitly created incentives to overcome the 
market failures that block technology transfer to poor countries. And finally, the 
clientelistic military rule period gave Bangladesh an ‘investor-friendly’ leader in the 
form of President Zia who saw the importance of underwriting foreign investments in 
the sector using informal support at the highest level.  
 
The garment sector emerged only because of a concurrence of these favourable 
conditions and provides a good example of why the emergence of productive 
organizations even in low technology sectors required an ad hoc management of rents 
that allowed significant market failures to be overcome. This happened in the context 
of the clientelistic military rule but was not part of the core rents that the LAO was 
creating and distributing. Nevertheless, it is possible that the separation of political 
rents from economic rents (and the downplaying of domestic attempts to create 
productive economic rents) allowed the leadership to manage the rents responsible for 
the takeoff of the garment industry without their capture by unproductive coalitions.  
 
The MFA created a serious problem for established producers of garments in 
countries like South Korea who suddenly found themselves quantity-constrained. 
They had a strong incentive to relocate production to countries that did not have 
quotas. But developing countries that did not have a textile and clothing sector were 
clearly relatively poor countries and suffered from market failures affecting 
technology acquisition and learning. To attract investors from more advanced 
countries who wanted to relocate, developing countries had to offer something more 
than just their quota-free status. After all, many poor countries were quota-free but 
only a very few benefited from MFA. Bangladesh was one of them and its success has 
to be explained in terms of specific mechanisms through which these market failures 
were addressed.  
 
By the late 1970s, domestic primitive accumulation had created numerous potential 
investors for a sector like garments where the efficient scale of investment was at 
most in the hundreds of thousands or low millions of dollars. The agent of change in 
Bangladesh’s transition was a joint venture between a retired Bangladeshi civil 
servant turned entrepreneur, Nurul Quader Khan, and a South Korean multinational, 
Daewoo. The joint venture set up Desh Garments in 1979, a partnership where the 
Bangladeshi partner provided capital and arranged government support for a new 
potentially risky investment, and the South Korean multinational provided the training 
and technology transfer. That a retired civil servant from Bangladesh could sit across 
the table with a global multinational and offer credible equity cannot be understood 
outside the context of the primitive accumulation that the country had just gone 
through. Daewoo’s calculations were straightforward. Bangladesh’s access to US and 
other markets through MFA was an attractive business proposition but they would 
probably not have been willing to take all the risks of investing in Bangladesh without 
credible commitments from the developing country.  
 
Equity participation from a joint venture partner provided part of this commitment, 
but perhaps even more important was the explicit support provided by President Ziaur 
Rahman to the project. President Zia’s support appeared credible because he took the 
initiative in linking up Nurul Quader with Kim Woo-Choong, the chairman of 
Daewoo. His support assured the South Koreans that unexpected problems would be 
dealt with or at least addressed. And in fact, political support at the highest level 
ensured that relatively small but critical institutional innovations like the back-to-back 
LC (which allowed Bangladeshi producers to borrow from local banks using export 
orders as collateral) and the bonded warehouse (which allowed complex customs 
duties on imported inputs to be avoided) were quickly introduced.  
 
Desh was remarkably successful. Between 1981 and 1987 its export value grew at an 
annual average of 90% (Rahman 2004). The learning and transfer of technology that 
was unleashed by this single project was remarkable. By the end of the 1980s, of the 
130 people who were first trained by Desh in Daewoo’s factories in South Korea, 115 
had become entrepreneurs and set up their own garment firms! From virtually a zero 
base in 1980, by 2005 there were around 3500 active firms in the garments sector 
employing upwards of 2 million people (World Bank 2005). Primitive accumulation 
continued to be an important source of entrepreneurial supply. In a survey carried out 
in 1993, 23% of garment factory owners responded that they had originally been civil 
servants or in the army (Quddus and Rashid 2000). We can assume that many others 
had close contacts with politics and had made their initial capital through political 
processes. From a country not much different from the typical African country in the 
1970s, Bangladesh’s manufacturing output today equals that of all of sub-Saharan 
Africa combined excluding South Africa.  
 
Table 3 Bangladesh Garments: Growth Rates of Dollar Exports 1985-2006 
Year Woven Knitwear Total Garments Dollar Export Growth Rates 
1985-1990   45.9 
1990-1995   24.1 
1995-2000   14.3 
2000-01   11.7 
2001-02 –7.1 –2.5 –5.7 
2002-03 4.3 13.3 7.2 
2003-04 8.6 29.9 15.8 
2004-05 1.7 31.3 12.9 
2005-06 13.5 35.4 23.1 
Sources: (based on  Mlachila and Yang 2004: Table 1; World Bank 2005: Table 1). 
 
The rapid emergence of Bangladesh as a garment exporting country is shown in Table 
3. Exports grew at double digit rates for more than two decades. By the early 2000s, 
the sector accounted for around 70% of Bangladeshi exports. By 1985, such was the 
success of the Bangladesh garment industry that Ronald Reagan negotiated quotas for 
Bangladesh under the MFA. Though Bangladesh continued to benefit from 
preferential treatment, particularly in European Union markets, effectively, the first 
five years of quota protection were enough to trigger a major shift in the country’s 
fortunes. This result had many contributing factors but in the first instance the MFA 
provided substantial temporary rents that served to induce learning and technology 
transfer in a context where the productivity differentials between Bangladesh and 
established garment-manufacturing countries meant that even this relatively simple 
technology would not be transferred despite the much lower wages in Bangladesh 
compared to countries like South Korea (Khan 2000, 2009).   
 
The MFA worked as a system of accidental learning rents because it provided 
relatively moderate rents that were part of an arrangement that was formally 
recognized as being temporary. Financing an initial period of loss-making when new 
technologies are being learnt is one of the important requirements that prevent 
startups even in low technology areas in developing countries. In principle markets 
should enable the learning to be financed but there are significant market failures that 
ensure that without some provision of rents, takeoffs even in low technology sectors 
are rare. The MFA rents, together with the investments that Bangladeshi investors 
were now willing to make allowed the necessary period of learning to be financed 
(Khan 2009). Success in learning garment manufacturing technology was rapid, so 
much so that the USA imposed quotas on Bangladesh by 1985 (M. A. Rashid 2006). 
Bangladesh also had a favourable political regime able to make small but critical 
institutional innovations to support a project that had political support at the highest 
level. The political regime was also able to meet its political stabilization 
requirements with other rents, and did not have to devise ways of letting its political 
clients capture the MFA rents by setting up unviable garment factories with state 
assistance.  
 
Interestingly, the owner of Desh Garments, Nurul Qader Khan was a civil servant 
who had made his money in the previous Awami League regime. Zia’s objective in 
supporting him was clearly explicitly to develop the economy, which was a separate 
objective from political stabilization. And finally, it worked because the country had 
at that time a supply of potential entrepreneurs who had the potential capability to 
learn how to operate basic technology, providing the market failure facing the 
financing of learning could be addressed. They also had access to capital from earlier 
strategies of political accumulation. The emergence of the garments industry, together 
with less dramatic successes in a number of other sectors like pharmaceuticals 
ensured that industry has been steadily growing as a share of GDP in Bangladesh, 
shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Bangladesh: Sectoral Shares in GDP 1980-2005 
1980 1990 2000 2005
Bangladesh Agriculture 31.6 30.3 25.5 20.1
Industry 20.6 21.5 25.3 27.2
Services 47.8 48.3 49.2 52.6
    Source: (World Bank 2008) 
 
The history of garments has implications as Bangladesh attempts to move higher up 
the value chain. Much of its growth so far has been at the lower ends of the value 
chain, even though there is evidence of growing backward linkages and 
diversification. By 2005, roughly 45% of export value was value added in the 
domestic economy due to growing backward linkages in spinning, weaving, dyeing 
and accessories (Bhattacharya, et al. 2002; World Bank 2005; M. N. Ahmed and 
Hossain 2006). The story of the garment industry’s success tells us that market 
failures in capital and knowledge markets were overcome through very specific policy 
and governance arrangements. The blocks of capital required for the next stage of 
upgrading are much larger and primitive accumulation cannot be relied upon to 
provide these investments. A survey of the garment sector in 2007 revealed that the 
available terms of financing were an important constraint to technology upgrading in 
the sector (Khan 2008). Banks were willing to lend but the fixed return and collateral 
requirements deterred investors who were not sure about the length of time learning 
would take. The sharing of risks and returns across a number of investors could in 
theory address this problem, but organizations could not credibly commit to reveal 
profits or pay dividends in the future, making these market solutions fail.  
 
As the problem of credible commitments to hold to contracts on sharing returns across 
multiple investors is a major problem constraining the growth in the technological and 
organizational sophistication of organizations, it is important to examine why this 
problem persists. Third-party enforcement by the state is too much to expect in a 
limited access order. But why do productive organizations and their associations (like 
the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association BGMEA) not 
attempt to engage in third-party enforcement of contracts? In fact, the BGMEA like 
some other business associations does engage in a limited range of arbitration 
activities but the limited nature of these activities needs some explanation.  
 
BGMEA has four arbitration panels, each specializing on a specific part of the 
business and the panels are constituted of well-known and respected businessmen 
who are active in BGMEA, and who voluntarily give up their time to engage in 
arbitration as a social service to the trade body. BGMEA is the most active amongst 
the different trade bodies in engaging in arbitration in disputes involving its members. 
The critical part of the relative success of arbitration under the aegis of the BGMEA is 
that a number of informal pressures are often used to get the parties to first sit around 
the table, and then subsequently to comply with the outcome. What is even more 
interesting is that these methods are used without formal BGMEA approval. For 
instance, the BGMEA gives UDs (Utilization Declarations) and UPs (Utilization 
Permits) that exporters need to show that they have appropriately used duty-free 
imported fabrics and yarns in their exports. These certificates are potentially very 
valuable because otherwise the garment factory becomes liable for significant import 
duties on the inputs they have imported. BGMEA has no formal powers to withhold 
these or other certificates from its members. Apparently the arbitration panels have 
asked the BGMEA for formal powers to sanction members in the context of 
arbitration, but the board has so far not conferred such powers to the arbitration 
panels. We do not know the full reasons behind this, but perhaps the BGMEA 
leadership was afraid of potential misuse of these powers which could lead to 
lobbying by members to return these powers of granting certification to the customs 
authorities.  
 
Nevertheless, arbitrators on these panels told us privately that hints that the granting 
of certificates may be ‘delayed’ were usually sufficient to get reluctant parties to 
attend hearings and in most cases to comply with outcomes. The fact that the 
arbitrators were themselves in the business also meant that they knew the hidden 
practices relating to profit-sharing arrangements or norms of compensation which 
often involved sharing profits or compensating different parties from profit that had 
not been declared. It is also clear that foreign buyers are aware of these arrangements 
and happily participated in them. This meant that arbitration through formal channels 
would be difficult in these cases anyway, but it gave informal arbitration a great deal 
of credibility because industry insiders had the knowledge to find acceptable 
solutions. This could involve, for instance, suggesting how to split losses using 
undeclared transactions such that both parties were reasonably satisfied in the context 
of unexpected problems.  
 
However, while we find many examples of arbitration in areas of trade (for instance 
how should losses be shared if a shipment is delayed or cancelled?), we do not find 
BGMEA arbitration in areas of disputes between investors in a plant. In general, the 
stakes involved in investment decisions are too high for the standard instruments used 
as threats to ensure compliance. While all organizations have an interest in improving 
the credibility of their contracts, as individuals contesting the interpretation of 
particular contracts all individuals and organizations also have an interest in 
challenging the judgement of an arbitrator if it goes against them. Without recourse to 
the threat of a formal enforcement procedure somewhere, the process fails at this 
stage. A trade body just does not have the credible threats to enforce contracts 
affecting major investments, even though it may have sufficient instruments to ensure 
compliance with the judgements in the case of contracts affecting particular 
shipments. This is why investment in productive organizations is still almost entirely 
organized by bank loans raised by individual investors pledging first class collateral. 
The growth of productive organizations is correspondingly slow because individual 
investors cannot absorb all the risks of learning new technologies. Organizational 
growth is therefore typically horizontal replicating areas of already existing 
competence. Investment in absorbing and learning more sophisticated technologies 
has therefore been relatively slow. 
 
There does not appear to be a strong relationship between the types of basic orders as 
they evolved in Bangladesh and the success of third-party enforcement that could 
allow organizational depth to increase in productive organizations. When clientelistic 
military rule was replaced by open party competition, the problem of third-party 
enforcement of investment contracts was not significantly affected. This is because 
different forms of the LAO in Bangladesh have primarily determined how political 
organizations have operated. Economic organizations require the support of political 
organizations in the sense that getting state officials to perform often requires an 
entrepreneur to have political friends who can organize the required services for a 
price. But the political organization is not in general required to sustain the internal 
organization of the productive organization. Moreover, political organizations even in 
the clientelistic military period were coalitions of organizers so it was always possible 
for a productive organization facing third-party enforcement against its interests to 
find protection from another political organizer. It would in general not be worth the 
while of a military ruler to take on an important organizer within his coalition simply 
to enforce a particular contract. With the advent of more open political competition 
after 1990, this problem has simply become more intractable.  
 
Our interpretation of the causes behind the rapid growth of the garment industry in 
Bangladesh also casts doubts on the argument that Bangladesh’s success was based on 
cheap labour and labour market flexibility. It is true that Bangladesh scores higher 
than India on labour flexibility (it is easier to fire workers compared to India) and 
indeed both Pakistan and Bangladesh score higher than India on the overall ranking of 
‘Doing Business Conditions’ of the World Bank. But the specific mechanisms 
through which the garment industry developed suggests that cheap and flexible labour 
by itself did not help Bangladesh very much before the market failures constraining 
investment in a new sector were overcome. Moreover, the persistence of cheap and 
flexible labour has not helped investment in the next stages of the value chain even 
though wages have remained low. The implication is that the development of more 
sophisticated organizations using more sophisticated technologies depends on solving 
specific market failures. The break that was provided by the MFA cannot be relied on 
for other sectors or for moving up the value-chain in garments and textiles. It is 
possible to imagine the political organizations in Bangladesh reaching an agreement 
to develop mechanisms for financing risk and cost-sharing for technology upgrading. 
This type of productive rent creation, if it was on a limited scale, would not 
necessarily compete with the political rents that political organizations were primarily 
concerned with. The institutional and political arrangements that would be required to 
manage such strategies are, however, not on the policy radar screen at the moment.  
 
Paradoxically, military-backed attempts at constructing political parties finally 
established the futility of attempting to construct a tightly regulated basic LAO in 
Bangladesh. The military leadership recognized that they could not define the 
dominant coalition either on the basis of force or attempt to accommodate all potential 
elites in a broad-based and inclusive dominant coalition. The praetorian version of 
military rule had failed because it used force too exclusively to define a narrow 
dominant coalition. The recourse to populist authoritarianism in 1974 was an attempt 
to define a broader but still tightly defined dominant coalition and this too failed 
because there were too many excluded elites for whom this was unacceptable. The 
period of clientelistic military rule was a transition period that defined the strategy 
that characterizes political management to this day.  
 
There was also an important change in economic policies. Unlike the praetorian 
period, the clientelistic military rule established a new consensus that politics should 
not concern itself with productive rent strategies. There was no attempt to use rents to 
create more sophisticated organizations or to absorb more sophisticated technologies 
than the ones that already existed. Rather, the focus of rent allocation by the dominant 
coalition became much more about the management of political stability. The 
emergence of the garments industry, itself the product of a fortunate conjuncture of 
conditions that enabled MFA rents to have very productive effects, allowed the 
political leadership to focus on the capture of political rents. The calibration of force 
and the distribution of rents that emerged during this period had features that 
continued into the next one. But the absence of any strategy of productive rent 
generation is a significant challenge to the system, as is the disruption caused by this 
pattern of political management, which we discuss in the next section.  
 
The clientelistic military period established that brute force could not be used to stay 
in power. The dominant coalition needed to have a significant section of civilian 
political organizers. But it could not absorb all potential aspirants either. The actual 
practice of the clientelistic military rule paradoxically established the norm that the 
control of violence in Bangladesh has to be based on a competitive system of rent 
allocation to allow the most important organizational and violence specialists to be 
brought into the ruling coalition at the cheapest price. However, the implicit links of 
the political leader in this system with the army meant that this process of bargaining 
and calibration had to permanently happen under a single leader. Other parties 
organizing opposition could at best expect some of their most important organizers to 
be bought off. But eventually the major political parties united to reject an 
arrangement that deprived them of access to the most significant rent allocation 
decisions. Ershad was overthrown in 1990 by a popular uprising when the army 
refused to continue to support him if it meant shooting at thousands of demonstrators. 
However, the return to ‘democracy’ kept intact many features of the system that had 
been established during this period. The major change was that the leadership of the 
dominant coalition became contestable in a competitive multi-party system where the 
leadership was selected by periodic demonstrations of organizational power by rival 
coalitions during elections.  
 
Current Phase: Competitive Clientelism and Vulnerable Semi-Maturity 1990-   
The overthrow of Ershad was followed by an election where none of the contestants 
were in power and were therefore unable to directly influence the administration that 
was in charge of organizing the elections. An ad hoc interim government led by a 
chief justice organized these elections and created a precedent for organizing 
acceptable elections in the future. As the administration remained tolerably neutral, 
the outcome of the election was determined by the organizational power that the 
parties could mobilize on the ground. The actual numbers of votes cast were almost 
the same for the two main parties in the 1991 elections but the BNP won significantly 
more seats because of the vagaries of the first-past-the-post electoral system, but also 
because the BNP had at that time a more extensive distribution of organizational 
strength. Even so, the BNP did not gain an absolute majority and needed the support 
of the Jamaat-i-Islami, a religious party, to be able to nominate most of the thirty 
women members of parliament that the constitution allows, thereby gaining an 
absolute majority. As the BNP was not in power and could not have influenced the 
police, the vote counters or any other administrative tool to influence the outcome, the 
electoral result was accepted by the losers.  
 
A fair election has come to mean that the outcome reflects the balance of forces on the 
ground without the interference of bureaucratic or military officials who are 
administering the police, the polling booths and the process of counting the votes. If 
these administrative tools are controlled by one side or the other, the outcome of the 
election may not reflect the forces on the ground. Note that the objective of a fair 
election in this context is not to discover the true preferences of the electorate, partly 
because true preferences may not exist given the absence of serious differences in the 
policies that the parties are likely to implement. Rather, elections are processes 
through which the organizational strengths of the competing clientelist coalitions are 
revealed. Stability is likely to be achieved if the party with a demonstrable superiority 
in organizational strength wins the elections. The requirement is that no party should 
be able to leverage its strength by using the administrative apparatus to give it an 
electoral advantage that is unrelated to its strength on the ground. The final (and 
current) phase from 1990 onwards can be described as a ‘competitive clientelism’ 
where the LAO has characteristics of maturity in the sense that the establishment of 
competing political organizations cannot now be controlled by the dominant coalition 
nor can they ensure that a coalition of oppositional organizations cannot eventually 
remove them from power. 
 
The electoral process built on elements of the competitive determination of the 
membership of the dominant coalition that had already been established in the 
previous period. The military-backed parties during the military clientelistic phase 
had accepted that new entrants had to be included in the dominant coalition depending 
on their organizational power and the price they demanded. The difference after 1990 
was that the leadership and composition of the dominant coalition itself was 
determined by an electoral test of the aggregate organizational power of contesting 
coalitions. Potential entrants into the dominant coalition now had two tasks. They had 
to demonstrate, as before, their ability to organize to deliver stability or violence in 
particular sectors or geographic regions. But now they also had to choose a party 
where they were most likely to get the best deal in terms of an offer of the highest 
rents for the organizational power they could deliver. Of course for well known and 
ideologically committed leaders switching parties was not an option. But for the vast 
majority of political organizers, party choice was and is determined by the offer of 
rents. Indeed, so blatant are these calculations that Article 70 of the 1972 constitution 
prohibits members of parliament from voting against their parties as otherwise the 
horse-trading and transaction costs before every vote would make voting in 
parliament prohibitively expensive.  
 
However, after the BNP won the 1991 elections, the next election would be unlikely 
to be fair according to what would be acceptable to clientelist parties if a particular 
party remained in charge of the administration organizing the election. The opposition 
demanded the institution of a permanent constitutional arrangement to have an interim 
caretaker government to organize every election after a government’s term was up. 
Intense pressure from the opposition and a failed attempt to hold an election that was 
boycotted by the opposition finally led the government to pass the 13th Amendment to 
the Constitution that set up a permanent institution of the Caretaker Government for 
Bangladesh in 1996. A neutral government was to be set up at the end of every 
government’s term with the last Chief Justice of the Supreme Court becoming the 
interim head of government. This was a unique institutional experiment to create a 
rule of law for elites at the critical moment of electing the next ruling coalition.  
 
However, this institutional arrangement was clearly not buttressed by a deeper set of 
credible threats that needs to underpin a rule of law for elites or even a ‘live and let 
live’ agreement. Any institutional system can be undermined if the underlying 
political compromises can be violated. The ruling coalition at any time always has an 
individual interest to try and prolong its stay in power, or even to try and undermine 
the opposition through institutional and organizational steps. The caretaker 
government system worked for two elections, despite minor attempts by both parties 
to interfere in the elections when they were in power. In both cases the ruling 
government was replaced by the opposition. But the hope that a new rule of law for 
elites had been institutionalized was short-lived. 
 
The constitutional caretaker arrangements collapsed in the run-up to the 2007 
elections when the incumbent BNP went too far and appeared to interfere with the 
dates of retirement of Supreme Court judges so that its preferred candidate could head 
the caretaker government. The result was an increasingly violent standoff which 
resulted in a series of general strikes (hartals) and violent street confrontations in 
which the opposition graphically demonstrated their violence capabilities. In a context 
of increasing uncertainty a group of bureaucrats backed by the military and the 
international donor community took over power on the 11th of January 2007 as a new 
emergency interim government. Under the constitution, the caretaker government has 
to organize an election within two months, but this caretaker government stayed in 
power for two years under emergency powers it gave itself.  
 
The emergency caretaker government turned out to have been a significant wasted 
opportunity. The emerging system of competitive clientelism had clearly not yet 
acquired a set of internal checks and balances to be fully self-sustaining. The 
emergency could have been an opportunity for investigating and establishing further 
checks and balances and indeed for establishing that if the parties could not agree 
other institutions in the country would intervene to break the deadlock. But instead, 
the caretaker government, headed by an ex-World Bank bureaucrat and backed by an 
army that was very close to the international community because of its lucrative 
involvement in international peacekeeping missions took a ‘good governance’ 
perspective on how to solve the problem. Their interpretation (no doubt strongly 
influenced by dominant western policy perceptions) was that the political instability 
was caused by political corruption. The opportunity for political corruption created 
the distorted incentives for politicians to interfere with electoral outcomes. This 
analysis suggested that if political corruption could be rooted out and if parties could 
be made to compete on the basis of alternative manifestos of delivering public goods 
(as in OAOs) the problem or electoral violence and standoffs could be rooted out. 
 
For the next two years the emergency caretaker government attempted to address the 
problem through ‘good governance’ reforms, and in particular through a focus on 
corruption, believing that the source of the problem of political violence was the 
engagement of political leaders in corruption. Hundreds and possibly thousands of 
political activists were arrested and incarcerated, including the leaders of the two 
main parties on charges of corruption. Hundreds of businessmen were arrested and 
some of them handed over millions of dollars to the new government as ‘ill-gotten 
gains’ under pressure (which later on turned out to include torture). Thousands of 
cases of corruption and extortion were introduced in the courts. The whole exercise 
was deeply flawed, not only from the analytical perspective of an LAO analysis but 
also in terms of procedures. In the end, almost all the cases had to be abandoned on 
the grounds that the evidence was missing or was inadmissible. The experience of 
anti-corruption cases globally suggests that even a single successful prosecution is 
very difficult as the participants do not leave paper trails and bank transactions that 
can unequivocally be established as corruption. Not surprisingly, the military 
caretaker government’s attempt to address the problem in this way failed dismally. 
The two arrested leaders of the main political parties had to be released, and one of 
them was elected prime minister in the 2009 elections.  
 
The main effect of the two-year experiment was a collapse in investor confidence that 
did not recover even a year after the election of a new government. The two main 
parties whose intransigence and violence had caused the problem in the first place did 
indeed receive a shock, but whether this will result in any lasting positive effect 
remains to be seen. The new government is effectively conducting business as usual, 
including harassing the opposition using administrative powers and there is talk that 
the caretaker system of government may be either removed or thoroughly changed. 
Both would result in a new crisis without a clear political consensus being achieved 
first. As the opposition does not even bother to go to parliament, it is not clear how a 
consensus can be developed. Instead of addressing pressing constitutional issues of 
how a rule of law for elites can be established, the government is focusing on many 
other less immediately significant issues which will absorb its time till the elections 
and then a new crisis of how to organize fair elections is likely to erupt.  
 
The failure to make incremental improvements in the mechanisms through which a 
competitive clientelism has operated the LAO in Bangladesh has significant negative 
implications. First, the threat of political violence remains undiminished. The paradox 
is that while the LAO has aspects of maturity in the sense that the dominant coalition 
cannot prevent the setting up of new organizations, the failure of a system of implicit 
rules guiding the entry and exit of political organizations into and out of the dominant 
coalition also gives the LAO many characteristics of fragility. The LAO can collapse 
very rapidly into fragility but the relative sophistication of political and economic 
organizations means that outbreaks of violence are not likely to result in a cumulative 
decline into anarchy. This cannot be ruled out, but there are enough stakeholders in 
business and in the international community who will intervene to try and stop it. The 
takeover in January 2007 was clearly part of such an intervention even though it was 
seriously misconceived.  
 
The problem for Bangladesh in terms of the LAO framework can be stated as follows. 
The explosion in the number of aspirants who want to accumulate through political 
organization has meant that a basic LAO is no longer a viable political proposition. 
Even as early as the 1960s, the attempt of the Pakistani praetorian order to manage 
rent creation and allocation for a defined set of elites was very vulnerable and 
eventually blew up in violence. The populist authoritarian one-party state did not even 
take off properly before the leadership was assassinated. The subsequent history of 
the LAO in Bangladesh has been about how to square this circle. Different attempts 
have also had important implications for the types of productive rents that the system 
could manage, as we have outlined earlier.  
 
The clientelistic military period demonstrated that the management of entry and exit 
cannot be permanently managed by a single individual as the rents controlled by that 
individual can become the target of a significant social mobilization by all political 
organizers. Therefore the emergence of competitive clientelism can be seen as a 
natural evolution of the LAO. However, making it work is not simple given the 
absence of third-party enforcement of the critical rules for entry and exit of political 
organizations into the ruling coalition. The political organizations themselves cannot 
enforce rules of entry and exit because the rents at that moment become zero-sum for 
some of the organizations. The caretaker government was an attempt to create an 
institutional third-party but history shows that it cannot be truly independent as 
governments can appoint Supreme Court judges. Indeed, the government also 
appoints army chiefs, though the last army chief appointed by the BNP went against 
the party by supporting the takeover of January 2007.  
 
Here a comparison with India is useful. India’s transition to an LAO with significant 
characteristics of maturity has also been subject to vulnerability, but in India, the 
organization of elections has not been a problem as in Bangladesh. Why is that the 
case given the many social similarities between the countries? One possibility is that 
India’s size and diversity helps it to organize third-party enforcement of the electoral 
rules through which competing political organizations can enter and exit the ruling 
coalition. At the level of the state, partisanship by the Election Commission can 
effectively result in ‘outside’ organizations intervening to assess whether formal rules 
have been excessively transgressed to the point that a party with inferior 
organizational power won. An impasse between warring parties at the state level also 
means that the federal government can impose president’s rule and re-run the election. 
Therefore, while election fraud, violence and rigging does happen in India as well, the 
parties know that an outcome that is out of line with the organizational strength of 
parties on the ground cannot be sustained. The problem with a small country is that 
neither the Election Commission nor the Interim Government has the credibility of 
being a neutral third-party. Therefore on top of the general problems of organizing the 
dominant coalition in a context of growing political demands from emerging 
intermediate classes, small countries have an additional problem of running elections 
that produce acceptable outcomes for competing clientelist parties. 
 
The challenge for Bangladesh will be first and foremost to revisit the rules of 
organizing elections such that all parties are satisfied that the ruling party will not use 
administrative power to shift the electoral outcome too much. The problem is not just 
of blatant stuffing of ballot boxes but also more subtle uses of police and 
administration to harass the opposition and to make their attempts to get their 
supporters out more difficult. Administrative bias has become more serious as a result 
of the growing tendency of the parties to replace the top bureaucrats with their own 
supporters within the bureaucracy when they come to power. Given all these 
constraints, clearly the electoral process will never be perfect in a country like 
Bangladesh, but the efforts of the ruling party have to be restrained if the outcome is 
to be acceptable. If this process is seen as a good governance problem, it cannot be 
resolved because the standards of any election in Bangladesh in the near future will 
not conform to those standards. If on the other hand, elections are seen as a problem 
of managing a restructuring of the ruling coalition in an LAO, and the outcome of the 
election has to reflect organizational power on the ground, a better discussion of the 
types of policing, third-party monitoring and enforcement and so on can ensue.   
 
One of the paradoxes of the growing political competition and the aspects of maturity 
that have emerged is that long-term investments have become more risky. If ruling 
coalitions can change every five years and if significant investments (in say power 
plants) requires rent-sharing with ruling politicians, the investor cannot be sure that 
the subsequent regime will not punish them by changing or cancelling contracts. One 
consequence has been that ruling coalitions have found it increasingly difficult to 
attract investors in long-term investment projects like power and infrastructure 
projects whose revenue stream has to be guaranteed beyond the life of a government. 
Here too, the nature of the LAO is at issue, rather than solely issues of corruption that 
the mainstream governance agenda focuses on. A more open public discussion of 
these issues may assist the judiciary to take a different view on these matters over 
time. The judiciary in Bangladesh has had a healthy tendency to provide judgements 
at variance with the wishes of the ruling coalition. So far, the judiciary has not taken a 
properly public interest approach in judging which contracts should be struck down. 
They have been more concerned to knock down legally dubious contracts when new 
governments have brought cases against apparent wrongdoings by previous 
governments. But it is possible to imagine that the conception of the public interest 
may change with a better discussion of the dynamics of LAOs.  
 
The emergence of relatively high growth from the 1980s onwards in a context of 
ongoing political instability has lulled elites in Bangladesh to think that the economy 
can perform despite the damaging games played by political organizations. The 
fortuitous accident of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement or MFA has been particularly 
lucky for Bangladesh and came at a time when little else was working in the country. 
This international accident created temporary rents and incentives for investment in 
learning in the garment industry. The effect was hugely positive because MFA did not 
allow a permanent dependence on rents simply because they could not be expected to 
last forever. And the terms on which these rents were allocated to particular firms 
could not be significantly manipulated by domestic political mobilizations.  
 
The conditions that allowed the emergence of the garments sector need to be 
understood because the replication of this very simple technology acquisition is by no 
means assured in other sectors. The ability of the ruling coalition to manage a few 
productive rents is critical if growth is to spread to new sectors. The replication of 
these accidental conditions through deliberate, yet modest, development of 
governance capabilities is a necessary precondition for the replication of these 
successes and their extension to other sectors in the context of the specific LAO 
characterizing Bangladesh. Here too, a better understanding of the rents necessary for 
the political sustainability of the LAO, and the rents necessary for accelerating the 
growth of organizational sophistication in the productive sector would be necessary 
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